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Abstract
An important activity within Space Traffic Management is the detection and prevention
of possible on-orbit collisions between space objects. The principal parameter for assessing
collision likelihood is the probability of collision, which is widely accepted among conjunction
assessment practitioners; but it possesses a known deficiency in that it can produce a false sense
of safety when the orbital position uncertainties for the conjuncting objects are high. The
probability of collision is said to be “diluted” in such a situation and to understate the possible
risk; certain approaches have been recommended by researchers to provide (largely
conservative) risk estimates and remediation methodologies in these cases. The present analysis
explores two of the main proposals for quantifying and remediating possible risk in the dilution
region and quantifies their operational implications. These implications with regard to imputed
additional workload are considerable, especially in anticipating the conjunction event levels
expected with the deployment of the USAF Space Fence radar. This effort has been undertaken
as part of a larger enterprise that seeks to clarify the philosophical and statistical underpinnings
of the conjunction risk assessment process. The analysis presented herein argues that a form of
hypothesis testing is implicitly used in conjunction assessment risk analysis, and that there are a
number of conceptual and practical reasons for constructing the associated null hypothesis to
counsel against a satellite conjunction remediation action. In short, it is concluded that, for the
purposes of determining whether a conjunction remediation action should be pursued, dilutionregion probabilities of collision should be treated no differently from those produced under other
circumstances.

Introduction
Space Traffic Management (STM) is a collection of a broad set of individual disciplines.
Intended to manage the use of Earth-proximate space, it includes studies and modeling to
understand space debris production, evolution, and mitigation; satellite design considerations to
reduce collision vulnerability and improve debris shielding; on-orbit safety operations for ascent,
satellite mission performance, and disposal; active debris removal conceptual and operational
development; and legal and policy considerations. The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk
Analysis (CARA) program focuses on the operational on-orbit safety portion of STM, creating
algorithms and software to minimize the likelihood of collisions between protected satellites and
other space objects and using these algorithms and software operationally to protect NASA
payloads. The purpose of these activities is not only to prevent loss of mission for the protected
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space asset, which has always been a consideration in conjunction assessment operations; but
also to protect certain important orbital corridors from debris pollution that could render them
largely to entirely unusable, or at the least create debris density levels that could accelerate a
chain reaction of debris-producing collisions and render the corridor unusable in due time. To
perform conjunction assessment risk analysis, one monitors close approaches between the
protected asset and the remainder of the known space catalogue; when close approaches are
discovered, they are analyzed in some depth to determine whether a collision is likely and
therefore should engender some type of collision mitigation action by the protected object. The
focus, therefore, is to develop and improve an evaluation mechanism that renders some sort of
probabilistic evaluation of the collision potential of a space object close encounter.
The original method of evaluating collision risk was to examine the predicted miss
distance (MD) between the two objects at their time of closest approach (TCA), and MD values
that represented “too close” a pass between two objects (one a protected asset) signaled
dangerous conjunctions and therefore candidates for a remediation action, such as a propulsive
maneuver by the protected asset to change its orbit to reduce the miss at TCA to an “acceptable
level.” The difficulty here is to determine what “too close” and “acceptable level” are, and in
examining the problem one quickly realizes that the distances that would correspond to these
adjectival phrases vary depending on the uncertainties with which each of the two satellites’
positions are determined. If the two satellites’ position uncertainties at TCA are extremely small,
then a miss distance that also typically might seem small could be acceptable so long as it be
sufficiently larger than the uncertainties. Conversely, a somewhat larger miss distance could be
notably larger than many times the satellites’ combined physical size but, due to larger position
uncertainties, still represent a potentially risky situation because many possible renditions of the
satellites’ actual positions, when including uncertainty, could place them close enough to collide.
To perform a durable assessment of the situation, an evaluation method is needed that considers
the orbital uncertainties to produce a probabilistic evaluation of collision likelihood.

The Probability of Collision
In support of the Space Shuttle program, researchers as early as 1992 had developed a
method of rendering such a probabilistic calculation.1 Called the two-dimensional probability of
collision (Pc), this approach is a quite rapid, (largely) analytical calculation of the likelihood that
the MD between the two objects will be less than a specified value. The approach requires that
the collision be of short enough duration that rectilinear motion between the two satellites as well
as invariant position covariances for them can be presumed during the encounter; this is not a
burdensome set of assumptions, as it is true of most actual conjunctions outside of the
geosynchronous regime. There are a number of published treatments that step through this
technique’s derivation in detail;2 what will follow here is a brief prose description. The approach
examines the conjunction at TCA, combining the two objects’ position error volumes into a joint
covariance and placing it at one end of the relative position vector (by convention the end with
the secondary object), and combining the two objects’ sizes and placing a sphere circumscribing
this joint size, with a radius called the “hard-body radius” or HBR, at the other end of the relative
position vector (the end with the primary object). From these assumptions, one can conclude
that if a collision is to occur, it will take place in the plane perpendicular to the relative velocity
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vector and that the marginal component of the probability perpendicular to the plane will
approach unity and can thus be ignored. Since the combined covariance is not changing over this
interval, one can project the entire situation into this plane (called the “conjunction” or
“encounter” plane”) and evaluate the collision likelihood in two-dimensional space. If this plane
is constructed to place the secondary object at the origin and the relative miss vector along the xaxis, one obtains the following:
Combined Covariance
Secondary
Object

Combined
Hard-body Radius

Miss Distance

Primary
Object

Figure 1: Conjunction-plane rendering of 2-D Pc calculation
The Pc is thus the amount of uncertainty probability density that falls within the HBR circle, as it
is those situations that reflect an actual miss distance that will fall within this circle. Since the
uncertainty volume (area once projected into the conjunction plane) extends to infinity (although
with of course ever-diminishing density), there will always be some probability density falling
within the HBR circle, although often the density is low enough that the Pc is essentially 0 to
machine numerical integration precision. The Pc calculation, which involves the integral of the
Gaussian probability density over the HBR circular area, is extremely fast (< 1/1000th of a
second in even a slow language such as MATLAB) and is thus a quite practical solution. In
addition to this cleanliness, the power of such a calculation is evident: the probability of a
collision is a concept to which decision-makers can relate relatively easily (especially if they are
already involved with risk management of some type), and the Pc can be placed against or
combined with other types of mission failure data and thus given appropriate context. The
conjunction assessment community has therefore embraced this parameter as the standard
collision likelihood calculation, with a typically-employed remediation threshold of 1E-04—
meaning that a conjunction remediation action, such as a propulsive maneuver, is taken when
there is a 1 in 10,000 chance or better of a collision.
“Dilution Region” Defined and Explained
While the concept of the Pc certainly seems straightforward enough, once one has
worked with it for some time a curious phenomenon emerges regarding an ambiguity of meaning
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with certain classes of low Pc values. In examining Figure 1, one can see that, for a given HBR,
there will be a particular joint covariance size that will maximize the amount of covariance
probability density that falls within that HBR and thus will similarly maximize the calculated Pc.
Because such a Pc maximum exists, growing or shrinking the covariance from this value will
produce smaller Pc values. To wit: if the joint covariance is extremely small, there is very little
probability density falling within the HBR circle, and the Pc will be small; if the covariance is
extremely large, then the probably density is spread out over a large area, and again there is
relatively little falling within the HBR circle, so in this case the Pc will also be small. Upon
reflection, these two paths to a small Pc value make physical sense. For the first possibility,
because there is little uncertainty in the primary and secondary states, it is highly likely that the
estimated miss distance will be close to the “true” miss distance; and if this nominal estimated
miss distance is somewhat larger than the HBR, then it is highly likely that the actual miss
distance is truly larger than the HBR, and the resultant Pc is thus low. This small joint
covariance is sometimes called the “robust” region of performance because the calculation of a
low Pc in this case is a robust result. For the second possibility, because the relative position of
the two satellites is so poorly determined, there is a broad range of possibilities for the actual
relative miss vector; and because the miss distance cannot be negative, it is relatively unlikely
that the actual miss will be smaller than the HBR; so a low Pc value is thus produced here as
well—not because the actual collision risk is known to be low but because so little is known
about the satellites’ actual positions that it cannot be concluded that it is high. This is sometimes
called the “dilution” region of performance because the Pc has been “diluted” to a low level
through high uncertainties in the satellites’ state estimates. Since a low but diluted Pc is
produced largely by data uncertainty, it cannot be taken as a warrant that the protected satellite in
such a conjunction is safe.
An analogy with car locations in a large parking lot, while not exact, is perhaps helpful
here. If two cars are parked in a large parking lot, and we have been told that one car is parked
close to one side of the lot and the other close to the other side, then we can conclude with a high
degree of confidence that they are not parked next to each other. If, however, all we know is that
the two cars are each parked somewhere in the lot, then we can also surmise that it is unlikely
that they are parked next to each other, but only because in a large parking lot it is extremely
unlikely that any two particular cars will happen to be adjacent to each other. In this latter case,
the low probability does not mean the data have shown us the two cars are far apart; it is only a
statement of the general unlikelihood of such an alignment if all one knows is that two cars
happen to be in the same general area—if better information were available about the two cars’
location, we might learn rather easily that the two cars are in fact adjacent.
One can depict this situation graphically, and the best way to do this is to plot, for a
particular conjunction, the Pc vs the ratio of covariance size to miss distance as the covariance
size is modulated; such a situation is represented in Figure 2. The situations in the robust and
dilution regions differ notably. If, for example, we begin with a large covariance (right side of
graph) and systematically shrink it, we begin with a relatively small Pc value, which increases
modestly as the covariance is shrunk until a peak is reached; and as the covariance continues to
be shrunk past the peak, the Pc drops off precipitously. It is of note that this sequence of events
aligns roughly with a typical conjunction event’s dynamics: when the event is first discovered
(usually seven or so days before TCA), the covariances are large due to the long propagation
time to TCA, the event is in the dilution region, and the Pc is low. As time progresses to TCA,
4

the joint covariance shrinks because the period of propagation is shorter and because in many
cases additional tracking has been obtained (thus also shrinking the covariance), but the miss
distance stays about the same; so the Pc increases and eventually reaches a peak. Finally, as
TCA is approached, the joint covariance shrinks to the point that the Pc drops off substantially (if
it were the rare case of an actual detected collision and no remediation were pursued, the Pc
would instead continue to increase up to unity). While this general paradigm is straightforward
enough, two issues that make it difficult to apply to actual conjunctions are the fact that the
nominal miss distance actually changes each time new data are used in a CA screening (typically
multiple times per day), creating a less-than-smooth progression, and often non-progression,
along the Figure 2 curve; and the maneuver commitment time, which is the point at which a
maneuver decision has to be executed, may not fall within the robust region, complicating the
risk assessment process.

Robust
Region

Dilution Region

Figure 2: Pc vs the ratio of covariance size to miss distance

This latter comment takes us to the issue that is the focus of this paper: how the CA risk
assessment analyst should respond when presented with a Pc value produced in the dilution
region, especially if the calculated Pc is low and would typically be seen as certifying a certain
degree of safety. Some commentators believe that the robust/dilution region distinction is
largely to entirely irrelevant when making remediation decisions3; others believe that the very
existence of this problem essentially invalidates the Pc as a conjunction likelihood determination
parameter.4 The position advanced here is that the utility of the Pc under dilution region
conditions is governed by two additional items: 1) the philosophical framework that subtends
the CA enterprise, and 2) the viability of alternatives to the Pc that can identify safe conditions
yet not interfere excessively with a primary satellite’s mission. These two questions will now be
explored in depth.

5

NASA CARA CA Philosophy
Safety is rarely an absolute but rather an incremental attribute; rather than becoming
“safe” after a certain amount of fortification, instead there is a graduated increase in safety with
the taking of increased precautions. Thus, with CA there is a trade-space between the amount of
safety investment (additional funding and additional mission inconvenience and interruption) and
the amount of catastrophic risk abatement realized, with no clear threshold indicating when
“enough” safety has been procured. In this sense, space safety is rather like automotive safety.
Vehicular deaths could be substantially reduced if all known automotive safety features and
devices were made mandatory, vehicle weights and reinforcement were substantially increased,
and speed limits dramatically lowered; but per-vehicle costs and user inconvenience/invasiveness
would be overwhelmingly increased as well. Where one wishes to be on the safety vs
cost/inconvenience spectrum is thus a prudential decision that, appropriately, is often more
heuristic than technical. In keeping with the automotive safety theme, as an example one can
examine the approach used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the division
of the Department of Transportation (DoT) that sets automotive safety policy. When evaluating
automotive safety devices, typically years of field data on the performance of the device (at that
point vehicle options that some consumers elect to purchase) are examined; and if the device’s
safety advantages are shown to be considerable and the cost (and other burdens) relatively
manageable and tolerable, DoT will consider making this feature mandatory. This same sort of
approach is used by NASA CARA in recommending conjunction assessment safety policies for
NASA, the principal difference being that so few satellite collisions occur routinely that policy
recommendations must rely more on studies and simulations than field data.
In adjudicating this safety continuum for CA, NASA CARA embraces the following
statement of principles: “To take prudent measures, at reasonable cost, to improve safety of
flight, without imposing an undue burden on space mission operations.” A number of important
points are extractable from this statement:
•
•
•

Prudence, not analysis or technical argument, is the ultimate governing paradigm in
selecting particular safety measures or approaches. The choosing of a risk exposure
posture is a human decision that considers as many non-technical as technical factors.
As there exists a trade-off between safety and cost, there is no mandate to “over-invest”
in safety, pushing its cost requirements beyond what is reasonable.
The burden that the safety activities, typically here meaning excessive orbit
readjustments, impose on mission conduct is an extremely important consideration; and
while mission accommodations to safety-related activities are certainly expected, a
balance must be struck that allows mission activities to continue largely unimpeded.

CA Decisions and Hypothesis Testing
As explained previously, the Pc is calculated from state estimates and covariances for
both objects in conjunction, propagated to TCA. Because of this, some individuals see the entire
enterprise as merely an estimation problem—one is taking the outputs from an estimation
process and making a straightforward calculation, which is then compared to a threshold; there is
6

no additional statistical scaffolding and complication required. One cannot deny a certain
reasonability to this claim, and it without question describes the manner in which many CA
practitioners operate: comparing Pc values to thresholds without even considering the activity as
part of a statistics problem.
However, there are aspects of the procedure that suggest a statistics context. First (and
perhaps somewhat pedantically), the calculation of the Pc itself, while it uses the results of an
estimation process, is not itself such a result—it is a subsidiary calculation and therefore not a
product of an estimation process per se; so it is not correct to assert that the Pc itself is generated
by an estimation technique. Second, the comparison of the Pc to a threshold defines a critical
region,5 leading to certain assumptions and actions; for example, if the Pc exceeds the threshold,
then the likelihood that the MD will be smaller than the HBR is too great and a remediation
action warranted. Third, while it is common to work with just the Pc and the associated
remediation threshold, many practitioners are wishing for (and some attempting to construct) a
confidence interval as part of the Pc calculation so one can understand the statistical likelihood
of the “true” Pc exceeding a given threshold.6 In short, the comparison of the result to a
threshold, the accompanying implicit definition of a critical region, and the desire for confidence
boundaries transforms the context from merely the observation of a certain calculated result to a
statistical framework that suggests the dynamics of a hypothesis test. Let us examine the
situation in more depth to determine what a hypothesis test context for CA decisions might look
like.
In 2012, V. Coppola offered the following definition of an on-orbit collision: “The miss
distance is less than or equal to the hard-body radius.”7 In a subsequent publication by J.R.
Carpenter et al., this statement was taken up as the null hypothesis for a study effort regarding
CA operations,8 both because it already existed in print in that form and because it allowed an
alignment of form with the usual construction of hypothesis testing: a calculated p-value (for
which the Pc is here serving as a proxy) smaller than the threshold (here the remediation
threshold) leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis. A small Pc value would therefore allow the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the MD is less than the HBR—a statement that can be used
accurately to describe CA operational conduct and therefore one that certainly seems reasonable.
While statistics texts often state, correctly, that the researcher has wide latitude in shaping
the null hypothesis for a particular problem, they frequently also remark that the null hypothesis
is the “typical” or “ordinary” situation,9 which one must marshal evidence to displace10; so the
null hypothesis should give the view or course of action that will be embraced in the absence of
compelling evidence to reject it. When evaluated in light of these considerations, a null
hypothesis that describes a risky situation (“the miss distance is less than the HBR”), for which
one would typically pursue conjunction remediation, is strangely formulated, at least in the light
of more than a decade of CARA operational experience. There are a number of inherent
disadvantages of and risks associated with satellite maneuvers (stuck thrusters, other mechanical
failures, gap in mission/science data until nominal orbit restored), so remediation is not seen as
the default action but one for which there must be explicit justification or argumentation.
Additionally, multiple different aspects of the conjunction dataset must all be in place for a
remediation action to be desirable — not only must the Pc be at a worrisome level, but the state
estimate data for the particular conjunction must be of a sufficiently high quality to be
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considered actionable and the space weather situation between the current time and TCA must be
sufficiently stable. These considerations suggest that a more appropriate null hypothesis for CA
would be not to remediate; or to follow Coppola’s formulary: “The miss distance is greater than
the hard-body radius.” This articulation more naturally accounts for the inherent risks of
remediation actions, and it gives a more natural manner in which remediation is rejected if any of
the three criteria listed above is not present. Finally, it also aligns with how seasoned operators
view the problem, namely to remediate only if all the aspects of the problem point to a
remediation action.
One could, in spite of these arguments, still maintain that the safer course is to remediate
whenever any indication at all of a conjunction risk exists, and thus that the null hypothesis
should be to presume a collision unless the evidence can disprove it to an acceptable level. To
do this, however, would be to ignore the space-debris-infused situation in which satellites are
presently placed into service. Current modeling efforts estimate that there are ca. 500,000 pieces
of space debris 1cm or larger in Earth orbit,11 a size that exceeds the shielding level of all
spacecraft, except perhaps those used for human spaceflight, and thus would cause mission loss
in a collision. Since the current catalogue size, maintained down to approximately 10 cm, is ca.
22,000 objects, about 95% of potential collisions do not even have the possibility of being
discovered and remediated; yet we accept this substantial risk and launch satellites anyway.
Since the very nature of current satellite operations already accepts that the very great majority
of the collision risk cannot be remediated, it does not seem consistent to propose that situations
with ambiguous or inconclusive data should default to requiring (often very large) remediation
actions rather than simply becoming a small addition to the unremediatable collision risk.
Instead, situations in which dangerous conjunctions are clearly identified, in the presence of
actionable data, are remediated; and other situations are treated in a manner identical to the large
number of unknown and thus unremediatable events that are sustained every day by dint of
simply occupying an Earth orbit. This posture seems to be the approach most consistent with
“prudent action, at reasonable cost, to improve safety of flight….”
Given the above, the recommended philosophical approach to CA risk assessment is as
follows. The fundamental question that governs the analysis of each event is “Do the presented
data provide evidence to justify a decision to remediate?” This framing of the fundamental
question places presumption with not remediating: evidence must be presented explicitly to
justify a remediation decision, and the absence or questionability of such evidence leaves the
situation in the default state of not pursuing a remediation action. The null hypothesis consistent
with this fundamental question, as mentioned previously, is “The miss distance is greater than
the HBR.” To reject this null hypothesis it is necessary to establish that the Pc is greater than the
remediation threshold (to an appropriate confidence level, if it is possible to assess this), that the
state and covariance data subtending the Pc calculation are durable and thus will produce an
actionable Pc evaluation, and the propagation situation is expected to be stable to the point that
the propagated states represent a credible estimate of the expected situation at TCA (typically
this means a relatively unperturbed space weather environment). If any of these three
components to the decision is not present, then there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null
hypothesis; thus the justifiable response is to refrain from a remediation action.

8

Hypothesis Testing and the Dilution Region
At the point at which a conjunction remediation decision must be made, any given event
can present a Pc that is above or below a remediation threshold and can also be in the robust or
dilution region. Given the above null hypothesis, and presuming for the moment that the state
data are actionable and the space weather situation stable, the following matrix would describe
the possible remediation decision outcomes:
Table 1: Remediation decision outcomes

Robust Region
Dilution Region

Pc > Threshold
Risky
Risky

Pc < Threshold
Safe
No Conclusion

When in the robust region, the evaluation is straightforward: because the covariances are
relatively small, then most of the miss distance probability density will be close to the estimate
of the mean MD; so if the Pc is above the remediation threshold, the situation is seen as risky,
and if below the threshold, it is seen as safe. In the dilution region, because the covariances are
large due to position uncertainty, much of the miss distance probability density is away from the
mean MD, allowing a much broader set of MD values and therefore driving the Pc to a lower
value. If despite this “diluting” effect the Pc is still above the threshold, then the situation truly
is serious and worthy of remediation (although the remediation action to create a post-action safe
situation might need to be larger than one would like, given the sizes of the uncertainties). If the
Pc is below the threshold, however, then no durable conclusion regarding safety can be drawn—
it might be the case that the two objects will not in fact pass all that closely to each other; or it
may be that they actually will pass dangerously close to each other but, because the uncertainties
in the data are so great, the reported Pc is low and thus deceptively reassuring.
In this latter case, while it would be possible to remediate such situations preventively,
the manner in which the fundamental question and null hypothesis have been formulated
establish that there is no requirement to pursue a remediation action in such circumstances. The
presence of a low Pc value in the dilution region is testimony to a poor understanding of the
orbital situation; and given that the data do not allow a clear conclusion about the situation, one
cannot definitively reject the null hypothesis and mandate a remediation action. The situation
instead becomes part of the very large holding of collision risk from objects below the tracking
threshold and thus unremediatable.
The matter is thrown into relief even more strongly by the imminent deployment of the
USAF Space Fence radar, a tracking radar with the advertised ability to track objects down to
5cm. It has been hypothesized that, when this new radar is enabled in the latter part of 2019, the
space catalogue will increase in size by a factor of anywhere from three to ten; and while there is
some variation due to orbital regime, the number of predicted conjunction events is expected to
increase by similar levels. Since nearly all of these new objects will be tracked by only a single
sensor and thus can be expected to have larger covariances, it is quite likely that many of the CA
events caused by these new objects will be in the dilution region. What posture should CA risk
assessment take towards such events? To maintain that there is a mandate to remediate such
9

dilution-region events seems ironic, since before this new radar was enabled these same events
were undetectable and therefore sustained each day with the risk unreservedly accepted. The
Space Fence did not change the number of objects in space or the expected long-term collision
risk for any protected asset; all it did was make operators aware of a larger number of such
objects and events. Given this situation, why would there be a mandate to pursue remediation in
situations in which new Space Fence data are ambiguous? Instead, one should act to remediate
when the evidence is clear and convincing, treating ambiguous cases in a manner similar to the
conjunctions presented by the large amount of untracked space debris.

Proposed Risk Evaluation Approaches for the Dilution Region
As argued above, given the fundamental imperative guiding NASA CA (“To take prudent
measures, at reasonable cost, to improve safety of flight, without imposing an undue burden on
space mission operations”), there is no mandate to remediate conjunctions in the dilution region
whose Pc values fall below the usual remediation threshold. At the same time, this imperative
does not prohibit the remediation of risk in such cases, so long as such remediation actions not
run afoul of the imperative’s final exhortation not to impose an undue burden on space mission
operations. In order to formulate a more robust set of best practices for CA, it is necessary to
investigate known reasonable proposals for risk remediation in the dilution region to determine
whether they could be so employed without imposing operational burdens. While such
investigation should be directed at any and all such proposals as they arise, two of the most
prominent will be described and examined here.
The Maximum Pc approach was developed and presented by S. Alfano in a paper in
2005. Recognizing that by definition events in the dilution region produce an undersized
(“diluted”) Pc due to what could be called an oversized covariance, the proposed technique
attempts to determine what the largest possible Pc could be, subject to certain constraints, for the
event if additional tracking data had been available. It makes the first-order presumption that the
effect of these additional tracks would be to shrink the covariance’s overall size while preserving
both its aspect ratio and the event’s nominal miss distance. It thus successively shrinks the
event’s joint covariance (or merely the secondary covariance, if it is believed that the protected
satellite’s covariance is well determined) iteratively, recomputing the Pc with each successive
shrinking, until a maximum Pc value is reached. If this maximum Pc is below the remediation
threshold, then one can conclude with some confidence that the event is not dangerous (at least
until the next state estimate update, at which point the entire situation could be altered). If the
maximum Pc is above the remediation threshold, then it is possible that the event could actually
be dangerous; one could plan and execute a remediation action to bring this maximum Pc value
down to a level considered safe. Depending of the size of this maximum Pc, the needed
remediation action might be quite large.
12
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Figure 3: Two examples of Maximum Pc computation for dilution-region events
Figure 3 above shows the possible Pc curves generated by shrinking the nominal joint covariance
until a maximum Pc value is reached (actually, here the joint covariance is both increased and
shrunk in order to form the larger continuous curve shown); the two plots present two different
archived CARA events. The graph on the left shows a situation in which both the nominal Pc
(6.3E-09) and the maximum Pc (4.6E-06) are below the typical remediation threshold of 1E-04,
so the event can be considered safe. The graph on the right represents an event in which the
nominal Pc is well below the remediation threshold (6.9E-07) but the maximum Pc is above it
(4.6E-04); this is a situation in which one could consider a remediation action based on what one
might call the “plausibility” of conjunction that the Maximum Pc construct reveals here. Of
course, it should be pointed out that operational experience is not kind to the assumptions that
subtend this method: typically, increased tracking both changes the nominal miss distance and
results in at least some reshaping of the joint covariance; so it is not clear that the Maximum Pc
really does represent an expected maximum, given that these foundational assumptions are likely
to be violated with each successive updates.
The Ellipse Overlap approach is a title that can describe a number of related proposals,
some of which have been raised and attempted over the years but a group of which has been
proposed and given a more rigorous theoretical underpinning by M. Balch.13 The general idea is
to enforce a certain separation of the two objects by minimizing to a stated level the overlap of
their covariance ellipsoids. A simplified approach to this that is somewhat easier to visualize
because it can be rendered in the conjunction plane is to enforce a separation between the joint
covariance and the HBR circle. At a naïve level, what would make one feel safe — to have the
HBR circle lie entirely “outside” the joint covariance error volume? In such a case, a collision
would not be possible. Of course, covariance uncertainty volumes do not in fact have defined
boundaries but extend to infinity; when rendered as an ellipse, what is reflected is the size of a
particular confidence region. So what is actually desired is to arrange for a situation in which the
joint covariance for a particular confidence interval—90%, 95%, 99%—does not impinge on the
HBR circle. The notional plot in Figure 4 represents such a case: the red ellipse is the joint
covariance in the conjunction plane (with center at the origin) at a nominal size, such as 1- or 211

sigma; the amber circle is the hard-body radius circle one miss distance from the center of the
joint covariance, and the blue ellipse is a higher-confidence-level rendering of the joint
covariance, let us say for the present the 90% confidence ellipse. If the 90% confidence level is
a level that a risk assessment analyst judged to be an adequate level of safety, then this situation
would represent a safe situation—the joint covariance, at the desired confidence level, just
touches the HBR circle. If the HBR circle were inside the blue ellipse, then the judgment would
be that there was not adequate separation between the covariance and HBR circle and that a
remediation action to increase this separation would be warranted.

Figure 4: Notional conjunction-plane plot of HBR circle, 1-σ covariance,
and 90% confidence covariance

Operational Implications of Dilution Region Evaluation Methods
The two approaches to dilution region risk evaluation described above are both easy to
understand conceptually and straightforward to implement; the remaining question is that of the
operational implications of the added conservatism of employing either approach. To get a sense
of this, both methods were employed against a subset of the 2017 and 2018 CARA historical
conjunction database. Conjunctions for twelve protected NASA spacecraft in the near-circular
700 km orbital regime were selected for this profiling exercise. About 11,000 events were
examined, originally captured by using a geometric screening volume 0.5 km (radial) x 17 km
(in-track) x 20 km (cross-track) about each primary satellite, looking seven days forward into the
future. Typically in CARA operations, each event is discovered initially seven days from TCA
and then updated three times per day with fresh state estimates and covariances, each propagated
to TCA. As explained previously, for most events the risk evolves temporally, beginning low
and then increasing to a peak before falling off sharply; so one must choose a particular time-toTCA at which to exercise the risk evaluation methods. Typically, the remediation action
commitment point or the point at which a remediation action decision must be made, is in the
neighborhood of 2 days to TCA; for this evaluation, results are tabulated for the 1, 2, and 3 days
to TCA points for each event. The great majority of CA events captured by a volumetric
screening process end up having a Pc, even a Maximum Pc, of 0 to machine precision throughout
the entire 7-day period; so the analysis here focused on dilution-region events with finite Pc
values.
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Table 2 below gives the comparative results. Each row in the table represents a different
remediation action commit point (1, 2, or 3 days to TCA). Column A gives the number of events
that would require remediation based on having a “vanilla” Pc value > 1E-04. Column B gives
the number of events meriting remediation using the Maximum Pc construct, here with this
maximum Pc value exceeding the regular remediation threshold of 1E-04. Column C gives the
number of remediation-required events found by enforcing a no-overlap condition between the
95th percentile joint covariance and the HBR circle, both projected into the conjunction plane.
Column D gives the ratio of remediation events required using the Maximum Pc construct to the
original Pc, and Column E gives the same ratio but instead placing the ellipse overlap results in
the numerator.

Table 2: Results of event profiling with different risk assessment approaches

1 Day to TCA
2 Days to TCA
3 Days to TCA

# of Events Meeting Remediation Criteria
A
B
C
D
E
Original Maximum Ellipse
Pc
Pc
Overlap
B/A
C/A
33
75
335
2.3
10.2
48
95
364
2.0
7.6
59
111
378
1.9
6.4

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from these data. First, and most mundane, is
that the number of remediation events decreases notably across all three methods as one moves
from event consideration at 3 days to TCA to that of 1 day to TCA. This is in conformity with
the behavior of the curve that defines the dilution region: that as TCA is approached temporally
risk builds to a peak and then falls off precipitously. Second, one observes that the Maximum Pc
method, if employed, would approximately double the number of remediation actions for
dilution region events, with the ratio becoming slightly more extreme as the remediation action
commit time is moved closer to TCA. A doubling of the number of such actions would be felt as
a large increase by a number of owners/operators (O/O), although the overall effect on O/O
workload is somewhat smaller given that only ~40-45% of the total number of events requiring
remediation occur in the dilution region (resulting in an overall multiplicative increase of ~1.6).
It may be more telling, however, to focus on the increase likely to be sustained in the Space
Fence era, in which the overall catalogue (and therefore number of remediation-requiring events)
could increase by a factor of three to ten, and dilution-region events are likely to occupy a larger
portion of the entire event set; a doubling of the number of remediation-demanding events, after
a previous increase of even a factor of three due to catalogue growth, would be untenable for the
mission performance of many satellites, certainly for most of the scientific payloads that NASA
operates. So while the event increase due to deploying the Maximum Pc approach could be
sustainable at present, it would constitute a poor precedent moving into the Space Fence era.
The ellipse overlap approach produces a much higher increase in remediation-required
events, and it is actually relatively insensitive to the confidence interval chosen (90% vs 95% vs
99%). One could bring down the mandatory remediation levels through a substantial lowering of
this confidence interval, but it is difficult to accept that a meaningful level of risk abatement has
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been achieved if one is satisfied with only a 50% percentile (or lower) confidence ellipse for
avoiding HBR circle overlap. Balch himself states that this particular paradigm may not be
workable for actual operational implementation, although he expresses hope that researchers can
use it as a foundational effort for developing something related but perhaps more serviceable.

Conclusion
The “dilution region” concept and concern has been part of the CA research conversation
since its introducing publication, and to date no single set of best practices has emerged to
govern how to address conjunction events in this region. By recognizing that the standard
method of performing conjunction risk assessment embraces hypothesis-testing mechanics, and
establishing that there are strong arguments for formulating the associated null hypothesis as one
that counsels against conjunction remediation, one can assemble a compelling case for
interpreting low Pc values arising from the dilution region in the same manner as any other Pc,
without special consideration for the fact that such a calculation could potentially be overstating
the safety of the event. Such arguments only gain strength when considered in the context of the
large amount of untrackable debris in which satellites presently operate and for which collision
risk is simply accepted—low-Pc, dilution-region events comprise one very small part of the large
number of conjunctions with untracked objects that are sustained daily, without knowledge or
action. Of the two principal approaches to evaluate and remediate possible collision risk for
dilution-region conjunctions, Maximum Pc methods might be deployable with current event
densities but could not be sustained with the expected increases that the Space Fence radar will
bring; and ellipse overlap methods are likely to be conservative beyond what operations can
sustain, both before and after Space Fence deployment. As such, it is CARA’s present
recommended practice to treat the Pc, regardless of dilution region positioning, as a durable
assessment of collision likelihood for the purposes of considering and selecting remediation
actions.
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